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1 Introduction
The sustainability of common-pool resources has become one of the central issues
in economic models and political agendas. Traditional theoretical models are pes-
simistic because they predict the collapse of the common resources. Since these are
non-excludable and rival, the rational behavior of the individuals leads inexorably
to an overuse of the resource. This is what has been called the tragedy of the com-
mons, expression coined by Hardin (1968). The tragedy seems to be unavoidable in
traditional models where the self-interest appears to be the only motivation of the
agents.
However, human behavior is very complex and the assumption of the strict self-
interested behavior is increasingly questioned. The evidence provided by psycholo-
gists (Tabibnia et al. (2008)) and biologists (Nowack (2006)) indicates that people
often care for the well-being of others. In addition, the experimental economic lit-
erature shows that the behavior exhibited by agents in situations like gift exchange,
bargaining or cooperation experiments cannot be explained by the self-interest hy-
pothesis (see Cooper and Kagel (2013), and the references therein). In this sense,
Ca´rdenas (2000) and Casari and Plott (2003) provide evidence of cooperative agents
in the laboratory that voluntarily contribute to avoid depletion of common resources.
Rustagi et al. (2010), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), Polania-Reyes and Echeverry
(2015) find evidence of other-regarding preferences (ORP) in field experiments with
local users that exploit a common resource. This could be suggesting that, at least,
some individuals have ORP. Therefore, standard microeconomic models which rep-
resent strategic decisions in the commons could be useless if they do not take into
account the possibility that the preferences of the agents are other than self-interest.
For this reason, we analyze the problem of the commons when the agents show
ORP. To this end, we consider that the agents not only care about their own in-
terest, but also they care about the other agents’ welfare. In other words, they are
concerned about the utility functions of all the agents. Thus, the incorporation of
theses ORP into the problem leads us to consider our model as a game with vector-
valued utilities. One of the most important consequences of this new approach is
that we can study the situation under different degrees of concern of each agent with
respect to the utilities of the other agents. Since the agents act independently, we
do not consider the possibility of institutional arrangements or collective actions for
managing the common resource as proposed in Ostrom (1990).
We obtain the set of equilibria in the vector-valued game of the commons. Since
2
this is a wide set and, depending on the situation, not all the strategies in the
reaction set are likely to be adopted by the agents, it remains unclear which of these
possible equilibria will eventually be attained in the game. Therefore, it is worth
investigating which equilibria will be reached when the agents choose their best
responses according to different attitudes with respect to the others. We consider
that the preferences of each agent are represented by a weighted additive value
function, where the weights are interpreted as the relative importance that this
agent assigns to the components of his vector-utility function. This allows us to
characterize several types of agent as equanimous, altruistic or impartial, depending
on the importance they give to their own utility with respect the utility of the other
agents. We focus on the latter, defining an agent as impartial if he considers all the
others equally. Within this type of agent, we distinguish between pro-social agents,
who are those for which their own utility is not more important than the utility of
the others, and pro-self agents, for which their own utility is at least as important
as the utility of the others.
We study the case in which the agents are all of the same type and also the
case in which both types of agent are involved. In the first case, when all agents
are pro-social, the tragedy of the commons is avoided since the total quantity at
equilibrium ranges between the social maximum, obtained when the aggregated
utility is maximized, and the absolute underuse of the resource, known as the tragedy
of the anti-commons. When all agents are pro-self, the tragedy of the commons
cannot be excluded since it constitutes one of the equilibria. However, it is not
the sole equilibrium. In this situation, the total quantity at equilibrium varies from
the social maximum to the quantity in which the resources are exhausted. In the
second case, when the agents are of different type, the strong conclusion is that only
a pro-social agent is required to avoid the tragedy of the commons, and it is not
conditional on other agents’ pro-social behavior, which differs from the conclusion
of Ostrom (1998).
A natural approach in order to more realistically predict the final results of in-
teraction consists of using conservative modeling techniques. Some experimental
evidence supports the hypothesis that social responsibility explains more conserva-
tive social decisions when the choice of each agent influences the well-being of others
as well as his own well-being (Charness and Jackson (2009), Bolton et al. (2015)).
Thus, in the last part of the paper, an additional decision rule based on a conserva-
tive attitude of the agents is considered and the corresponding subsets of equilibria
are identified. A remarkable conclusion is that when all the agents are of the same
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type, either pro-social or pro-self, in a conservative equilibrium all the agents make
use of the resource at the same level.
Our results have interesting implications for economic and environmental poli-
cies. If they are inspired in the self-interest assumption and the consequent inex-
orability of the tragedy of the commons, then the efficient solutions to avoid the
depletion of the resources are either giving the control of the most natural resource
system to the central government or the assignment of ownership right. However,
if the agents show ORP, sustainability is not only a possible result of the model
but also the most likely result. Therefore, environmental policies should go beyond
the usual economic recommendations. In short, the design of more effective policies
requires integration of ORP into the environmental policy theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation and a
summary of the theoretical results that will be used in our analysis. In Section 3, we
formalize the types of agent with other-regarding preferences which will be involved
in our model. Section 4 analyzes the game of the commons with other-regarding
agents and presents the results on the equilibria for different types of agent. In
Section 5, in order to reduce the sets of equilibria, we consider a conservative attitude
of each agent with respect to the utility values that can be obtained. Section 6 is
devoted to the concluding remarks. In order to ease the presentation, proofs are
included in an Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce notations and definitions and, in order to make the
paper self-contained, we summarize some results that will be applied in the following
sections. The results in Theorems 1 and 2 have been established in Ma´rmol et al.
(2016) for general games in which the agents have different vector-valued utilities.
The games arising when the agents show other-regarding preferences are special
cases in which all the agents have the same vector-valued utility. The mentioned
results are applied in Section 4 in order to obtain the equilibria for these games.
The following notation will be used. Let IR(IR+) denote the set of all (non-
negative) real numbers and let IRk(IRk+) be the k-fold Cartesian product of IR(IR+).
The origin of IRk is 0k and 1k is an k-dimensional vector with components equal to
one. We use the conventional notation for comparison of vectors: x ≥ y indicates
that x ≥ y and x 6= y, and x > y indicates that xi > yi for all i = 1, . . . , k.
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A vector-valued normal-form game is represented by G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N}, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, Ai is the set of strategies that agent i ∈ N
can adopt and the mapping ui : ×i∈NAi → IRsi , is the vector-valued utility function
of agent i, ui := (ui1, . . . , u
i
si), where s
i indicates the number of components of
the utility function of agent i. Denote by J i = {1, ..., si} the set of indices of
such components. A profile of strategies, a = (a1, . . . , an), with ai ∈ Ai, for a
game G can be written as a = (ai, a−i), where ai is a strategy of agent i, and
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) stands for the strategy combination of all players
except player i.
Definition 1. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is an equilibrium for the vector-
valued game G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that ui(ai, a∗−i) ≥
ui(a∗i, a∗−i).
The set of all equilibria of game G is denoted by E(G).
Definition 2. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is a weak equilibrium for the
vector-valued gameG = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that ui(ai, a∗−i) >
ui(a∗).
The set of all weak equilibria of game G is denoted by Ew(G).
When for all i ∈ N the sets of strategies Ai are nonempty convex subsets of a
finite dimensional space and the functions uij are strictly concave in a
i for all j ∈ J i
then the set of weak equilibria and the set of equilibria coincide.
The set of equilibria of these games can be described in terms of the reaction
function of the components of the utility function under certain conditions. Let rij
denote the correspondence of best response of agent i in relation to the j-th utility
component.
Theorem 1. (Ma´rmol et al. (2016)) If for all i ∈ N , Ai is a nonempty convex
compact subset Ai ⊆ IR, and uij is strictly concave in its own action for each j ∈ J i,
then the set of equilibria of the game with vector-valued utilities G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N}
is
E(G) = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ×i∈NAi : ri(a−i) ≤ ai ≤ r¯i(a−i), i ∈ N},
where ri(a−i) = minj∈Ji rij(a
−i), and r¯i(a−i) = maxj∈Ji rij(a
−i).
A similar result characterizes the set of weak equilibria when the assumption
of strict concavity of the components of the multidimensional utility is relaxed to
concavity.
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We assume that the preferences of each agent are represented by a weighted
additive value function. Let ∆s
i
= {λi ∈ IRsi : ∑sij=1 λij = 1, λij ≥ 0}, and ∆ =
×ni=1∆si . For λ ∈ ∆, weighted scalar game Gλ = {(Ai, viλ)i∈N} is defined, with
viλ(a) =
si∑
j=1
λiju
i
j(a).
Definition 3. For λ ∈ ∆, an action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n), is a Nash equilibrium
for the game Gλ if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that vλ(ai, a∗−i) > vλ(a∗).
E(Gλ) denotes the set of Nash equilibria of game Gλ = {(Ai, viλ)i∈N}.
Bade (2005) establishes the relationship between the set of equilibria of a vector-
valued game and the sets of equilibria of weighted games with positive weights and
with non-negative weights. Moreover, in Ma´rmol et al. (2016) it is proven that the
equilibria of weighted games with non-negative weights are weak equilibria of the
corresponding game with vector-valued utilities.
When information about the preferences of the agents is available, it can be
applied in order to reduce the set of equilibria. The information is formalized by
means of information sets, which in general are different for each agent. Consider
a subset of weights for each agent, Λi ⊆ ∆si , representing partial information on
the relative importance that the agent assigns to the components of his vector-
valued utility function. Denote Λ = ×i∈NΛi the set containing all the preference
information.
Definition 4. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is an equilibrium for the game
with preference information Λ if for each i ∈ N, ∃λi ∈ Λi such that viλ(a∗) ≥
viλ(a
i, a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai .
EΛ(G) denotes the set of equilibria of the game with preference information.
When the information sets are polyhedra they can be characterized by their
extreme points. For i = 1, . . . , n, let Λi be a polyhedron with pi extreme points
{λ¯(1), . . . λ¯(pi)}, and let Bi be the pi×mi matrix whose rows are the extreme points
of Λi. For each i ∈ N , define a function, viΛ, with values in IRpi , given by viΛ = Bi ·ui.
Theorem 2. (Ma´rmol et al. (2016)) Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-
valued utilities such that each Ai is a nonempty convex subset of a finite dimensional
space and for each i, ui is concave in ai. Then the set of equilibria of the game
with preference information Λ coincides with the set of weak equilibria of the game
{(Ai, viΛ)i∈N}.
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If for each i ∈ N , the components of ui are strictly concave, then the set of
equilibria and the set of weak equilibria of {(Ai, viΛ)i∈N} coincide. Note that, for
the case in which no preference information exists (that is, for Λ = ×i∈N∆si), this
result establishes that under concavity assumptions, the set of weak equilibria of
the vector-valued game coincides with the set containing all the equilibria of the
weighted games with non-negative weights.
3 Agents with other-regarding preferences
In this section we consider different attitudes of the agents with respect to their
self-interest and the well-being of the others. As mentioned, the literature shows
that the agents’ behavior is not always selfish. Rather, in some situations they care
about the other agents’ welfare.
We introduce these ORP of the agents into the model by considering decision
problems in which a set of agents N = {1, ..., n}, each one with an individual
real-valued utility function, uj, j ∈ N , takes into account the utilities of all of the
group. In this case, we denote the vector-valued utility function of each agent as
u := (uj)j∈N . Note that in this initial setting, the vector-valued utility functions
of all the agents coincide. However, the preferences which the agents exhibit with
respect to the values of these utilities are generally different. That is, they assign
different importance to their own individual utility than to the utilities of others.
We analyze the behavior of the agents under different social attitudes which are
represented by the preferences they show with respect to all the agents’ utility
functions.
We assume that the preferences of agent i on the utilities of the set of agents
is represented by a value function νi : IRn → IR. This function νi provides the
evaluation that agent i gives to each vector of utilities of all the group. We define
different types of agents which depend on the attitudes that they exhibit with respect
to these utilities.
A permutation pi in the set of agents N is a bijection pi : N → N . Let ΠN
denote the set of permutations in N . Consider pi ∈ ΠN , for a vector u ∈ IRn, denote
upi := (upi(j))j∈N . Let pi−j denote a permutation of the set of agents N \ j.
Definition 5. Let N be a set of agents in which for all i ∈ N the vector-valued
utility function of agent i is u := (uj)j∈N , and let the preferences of agent i be
represented by the value function νi. An agent i ∈ N is
7
a) equanimous if for each u ∈ IRn and each pi ∈ ΠN , νi(u) = νi(upi).
b) impartial if for each u ∈ IRn, and each pi ∈ ΠN , νi(ui, u−i) = νi(ui, upi−i).
c) altruistic if there exist u, u¯ ∈ IRn, with ui < u¯i, such that νi(u¯) ≤ νi(u).
d) egoistic if for all u, u¯ ∈ IRn, with ui < u¯i, νi(u) < νi(u¯).
The property of equanimity is a property of symmetry stating that the names of
the agents do not matter. That is, the evaluation of agent i of the vector of utilities
of all the group does not change if the agents permute their results. Impartiality
means that the agent considers all the others equally. Altruism and egoism are
opposites. Altruism is defined here in its widest sense. It means that it is possible
that, at least for one utility vector, the agent puts the benefit of others before to his
own.
Since we assume that the preferences of the agents are additive, then for each
i ∈ N the value function is νi(u) = ∑nj=1 λijuj, where λi ∈ ∆n, and each component
of λi, λij, can be interpreted as the relative importance that agent i assigns to the
individual utility of agent j. The different attitudes of the agents are characterized
in terms of the weights in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. If the value function of agent i ∈ N is νi(u) = ∑nj=1 λijuj, with λi ∈ ∆n,
then agent i is
a) equanimous if and only if λij = λ
i
k for all j, k ∈ N .
b) impartial if and only if λij = λ
i
k for all j, k 6= i.
c) altruistic if and only if λij > 0 for some j 6= i.
d) egoistic if and only if λij = 0 for all j 6= i.
We particularly analyze two types of behavior depending of the agents’ attitude
toward their own utility and the utilities of the others. First, we consider pro-
social agents, who are those impartial agents for which their own utility is not more
important than that of the others. Secondly, pro-self agents, who are those impartial
agents for which their own utility is at least as important as that of the others.
Definition 6. Let νi(u) =
∑n
j=1 λ
i
juj be the value function of an impartial agent
i ∈ N , with λi ∈ ∆n. Agent i is pro-social if λii ≤ λij for all j ∈ N . Agent i is
pro-self if λii ≥ λij for all j ∈ N .
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Note that pro-self agents can be either altruistic agents or egoistic agents. How-
ever, a pro-social agent is always altruistic. In addition, the union of the set of pro-
social agents and the set of pro-self agents constitutes the set of impartial agents.
As a particular case, agents who are both pro-social and pro-self are equanimous.
4 The behavior of the agents in the commons
In this section we analyze the well-known game of the commons in the extended
setting where the strategic behavior of the agents is determined by a certain social
attitude. Previously, we state the usual formulation of the game of the commons.
4.1 The standard game of the commons
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of individuals that have access to a finite common-pool
resource. Let mi be the number of units used by agent i, i ∈ N , and M = ∑ni=1mi
the total units used. Let V (M) be the unit value when M units have been used.
We assume that this function verifies some conditions. There is a maximum number
of units that can be used, Mmax, such that from this value, function V (M) is equal
to zero. In addition, V (M) is strictly decreasing, twice differentiable and strictly
concave in (0,Mmax).
In this game the strategies refer to quantities, thus Ai ⊆ IR+. Moreover, the
total units the agents are able to use is bounded by Mmax, that is A
i = [0,Mmax] for
i ∈ N . The utility function for agent j is uj : ×ni=1Ai → IR, with uj(m1, ...,mn) =
mjV (
∑n
i=1m
i) which, under the assumptions on V , is strictly concave with respect
to his own action. For each agent i ∈ N , ri(m−i) denotes the reaction function to
the actions of the other agents, m−i = (m1, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mn). Under these
assumptions, there is a unique Nash equilibrium m∗ = (m∗1, ...,m∗n) in which each
agent maximizes his utility given the actions of the other agents. This equilibrium is
obtained as the intersection of the graphs of the reaction functions of all the agents,
and is symmetric, that is, m∗ = (M
∗
n
, ..., M
∗
n
), where M∗ is the total quantity at
equilibrium. This quantity yields the overuse of the resource since each agent only
considers their own situation and not the effect of his decisions over the others.
In this standard model, the alternative to the agents acting individually is the
possibility of maximizing the aggregated utility, uS(m) =
∑n
j=1 uj(m), that is,
uS(m
1, ...,mn) = (
∑n
i=1 m
i)V (
∑n
i=1m
i). For each agent i, the reaction function
with respect to the aggregated utility is denoted by riS(m
−i). The maximizers of
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this aggregated utility are {(m1, ...,mn) ∈ IRn+ :
∑n
i=1m
i = S∗}, where the quantity
S∗ = arg max×ni=1AiMV (M) is called the social maximum. By comparing the total
amount at equilibrium, M∗, and the social maximum S∗, it follows that M∗ > S∗.
That is, when all the agents act as one, a more rational use of the common is made,
since the number of units used would be lower, but all the agents can obtain a higher
utility when dividing the maximum aggregated utility.
4.2 The commons with other-regarding agents
In order to analyze other-regarding preferences of the agents in the commons, we sup-
pose that each agent takes into account all the agents’ utility functions. Therefore,
this new situation can be analyzed as a n-person game in which each agent considers
the same vector-valued utility function u : ×ni=1Ai → IRn, with u := (uj(m))j∈N ,
defined for j ∈ N as uj(m) = mjV (
∑n
i=1 m
i). The game of the commons with
other-regarding agents is denoted by G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}.
Note that this game is a special case of a vector-valued game, as described in
Section 2, in which all the agents have the same vector-valued utility. Therefore,
the definition of equilibrium is the following.
Definition 7. An action profile (m∗i,m∗−i) is an equilibrium for the vector-valued
gameG = {(Ai, u)i∈N} if /∃ i ∈ N withmi ∈ Ai such that u(mi,m∗−i) ≥ u(m∗i,m∗−i).
For i ∈ N , denote by Ri the correspondence which represents the best response
of agent i to the actions of the other agents. In the case of vector-valued utilities, the
best response of one agent given the actions of the other agents is not in general a
singleton, but a subset of its set of strategies, Ri(m−i) ⊆ Ai: those strategies of agent
i, such that he does not improve his vector-valued utility by deviating from them.
Thus, an action profile (m∗i,m∗−i) is an equilibrium for the game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}
if and only if m∗i ∈ Ri(m∗−i) for i ∈ N . For i, j ∈ N , let rij(m−i) be the reaction
function of agent i corresponding to the j-component function uj of his vector-valued
utility u, that is to say, with respect to the utility of agent j.
The following result identifies the equilibria for the game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}.
Proposition 1. The set of equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
E(G) = {(m1, ...,mn) : 0 ≤ mi ≤ ri(m−i), i ∈ N}.
Example 1. Suppose that n herdsmen take their sheep to a pasture open to all.
Let mi, i = 1, . . . , n, be the number of sheep of herdsman i in the pasture, and
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Figure 1: The reaction set of agent 1 and the set of equilibria
V (M) = a−M2 the value of one sheep when there are M sheep in the pasture. The
individual benefit for herdsman j is
uj(m) = m
j(a− (∑ni=1mi)2).
Under the assumption that the preferences of the herdsmen are other-regarding,
the situation can be modeled as a vector-valued game. In this game all the herdsmen
consider the same vector-valued utility function. The components of this function
are the individual benefits of each herdsman, that is,
u(m) = (ui(m))i∈N , ui(m) = mi(a− (
∑n
j=1 m
j)2), i ∈ N.
For a two-agent situation, the corresponding best response function of agent i to
the actions of agent j with respect to the first and second component of his utility
function are
ri1(m
j) =
−2mj+
√
(mj)2+3a
3
, ri2(m
j) = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
By applying Proposition 1 the set of equilibria is
E(G) =
{
m ∈ IR2+ : m1 ≤ −2m
2+
√
(m2)2+3a
3
, m2 ≤ −2m1+
√
(m1)2+3a
3
}
.
In Figure 1, the reaction set for agent 1 (left-hand side) and the set of equilibria
E(G) for the two-person, two-component game (right-hand side) are represented.
Note that in this setting, the set of Nash equilibria for the game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}
is a wide set. Since, depending on the situation, not all the strategies in the reaction
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set are likely to be adopted by the agents, it remains unclear which of these possible
equilibria will eventuate in the game. For this reason, it is worth investigating which
equilibria will be reached when the agents choose their best responses according to
different attitudes with respect to the results of others.
4.3 Pro-social agents in the commons
In this section we focus on the game of the commons with agents for which their
own benefits are not more important than the benefits of others, and consider the
benefits of the remaining agents equally. Recall that in Section 3 an agent of this
type is named a pro-social agent. The set of weights for a pro-social agent i is
Λisoc = {λi ∈ Λi : λii ≤ λij, λij = λik, j, k 6= i}.
Denote Λsoc = ×i∈NΛisoc.
It follows from Theorem 2, that when information about the preferences of the
agents is incorporated into the original game of the commons, G = {(Ai, u)i∈N},
the equilibria coincide with those of a transformed vector-valued utility game. The
game of the commons with preference information Λsoc is established in the following
result.
Proposition 2. The set of pro-social equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} coincides
with the set of equilibria of game {(Ai, viΛsoc)i∈N}, where
viΛsoc(m
1, ...,mn) =
 n∑
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n− 1V (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
 .
In this situation, the game is transformed into a vector-valued game whose utility
function has two components. The first component of the transformed vector-valued
utility of agent i is the average of the benefits of all the agents excluding agent i.
This evaluation represents an extreme concern for the other agents, given that agent
i does not take into account his own profit. The second component is the average
of the benefits of all agents, which represents a responsible social behavior. The set
of equilibria is described in the following result.
Proposition 3. The set of pro-social equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EΛsoc(G) = {(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ IRn+ :
∑
i∈N
mi ≤ S∗}.
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Figure 2: Reaction set of a pro-social agent and pro-social equilibria
Example 2. (Example 1 continued) For the commons game when the two agents are
pro-social the preference information for each agent is
Λisoc = {λi ∈ Λi : λii ≤ λij}.
The corresponding best response function of agent i to the actions of agent j
for each component of his new vector-valued utility function are rˆi1(m
j) = 0 and
riS(m
j) =
√
a
3
−mj. The set of pro-social equilibria is
EΛsoc(G) =
{
(m1,m2) ∈ IR2+ : m1 +m2 ≤
√
a
3
}
.
Figure 2 represents the reaction set of a pro-social agent 1 (left-hand side) and
the set of pro-social equilibria EΛsoc(G) (right-hand side).
Note that when all the agents are pro-social, the Nash equilibrium of the standard
game is never attained. Instead, only those points with total quantity below the
social maximum, S∗ =
√
a
3
, are equilibria.
4.4 Pro-self agents in the commons
We now analyze the game of the commons G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} with agents for which
their own benefits are at least as important as the benefits of others, and consider
the benefits of the remaining agents equally. In Section 3 an agent of this type is
named a pro-self agent. The set of weights for a pro-self agent i is
Λiself = {λi ∈ Λi : λii ≥ λij, λij = λik, j, k 6= i}.
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Denote Λself = ×i∈NΛiself .
The incorporation of the information about the preference of each agent i into the
original game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}, permits the identification of the set of equilibria
for the game with preference information Λself , as well as a corresponding two-
component utility function for each agent in this game, as the following result states.
Proposition 4. The set of pro-self equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} coincides
with the set of weak equilibria of game {(Ai, viΛself )i∈N}, where
viΛself (m
1, ...,mn) =
(
miV (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
)
.
Note that the first component of the transformed utility of agent i is his own
benefit, i.e. his own utility function ui, which represents a rational behavior, and
the second component is the average of the benefits of all agents, which represents
a responsible social behavior. The following result identifies the equilibria for the
game of the commons with pro-self agents.
Proposition 5. The set of pro-self equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EΛself (G) = {(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ IRn+ :
∑
i∈N
mi ≥ S∗, mi ≤ ri(m−i),∀i ∈ N}.
Example 3. For the commons game with preference information Λself in Example 1,
the best response function of agent i to the actions of agent j with respect to each
component of his new vector-valued function are
ri(mj) =
−2mj+
√
(mj)2+3a
3
and riS(m
j) =
√
a
3
−mj.
The set of pro-self equilibria is
EΛself (G) =
{
m ∈ IR2+ : m1 +m2 ≥
√
a
3
, m1 ≤ −2m2+
√
(m2)2+3a
3
,m2 ≤ −2m1+
√
(m1)2+3a
3
}
.
Figure 3 represents the reaction set of agent 1 (left-hand side) and the set of
pro-self equilibria EΛself (G).
Note that this set includes the Nash equilibrium of the standard game of the
commons, and that no profile of strategies which yields a total quantity below the
social maximum, S∗ =
√
a
3
, is an equilibrium.
Remark. It is interesting to note that the whole set of equilibria of the game of the
commons coincides with the union of the set of pro-social equilibria and the set of
pro-self equilibria of the game of the commons even though we are not considering all
the possible weights, only those associated to impartial agents, i.e., Λsoc∪Λself ⊂ ∆n.
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m2
r1
r1s p
a
3
R1
p
a
m1
m2
E⇤self (G)
Figure 3: Reaction set of a pro-self agent and pro-self equilibria
4.5 Pro-social and pro-self agents in the commons
We now analyze the game of the commons with both types of agent. That is, the set
of agents is divided into two groups: the set of pro-social agents, Nsoc = {1, . . . , k},
and the set of pro-self agents, Nself = {k + 1, . . . , n}.
Let Λcro = Λ
1
soc× . . .×Λksoc×Λk+1self × . . .×Λnself be the set of information weights
for the game of the commons G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}. We name the equilibria of the game
with this information crossed equilibria. The set of crossed equilibria is stated in
the following results.
Proposition 6. The set of crossed equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} coincides
with the set of weak equilibria of game {(Ai, viΛcro)i∈N}, where
viΛcro(m
1, ...,mn) =
 n∑
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n− 1V (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
 for i ∈ Nsoc.
viΛcro(m
1, ...,mn) =
(
miV (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
)
for i ∈ Nself .
Note that the average of the benefits of all agents, which represents a responsible
social behavior is always a component of the transformed utility of all the agents.
Recall that for a pro-social agent i the reaction functions with respect to the
components of the vector-valued utility function are ri1(m
−i) = 0 and riS(m
−i) re-
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spectively, and for a pro-self agent are ri1(m
−i) (the reaction function of agent i with
respect to his own benefit) and riS(m
−i). The following proposition identifies the
equilibria for the game of the commons with crossed agents.
Proposition 7. The set of crossed equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EΛcro(G) = {(m1, . . . ,mn) :
∑
i∈N
mi = S∗}.
Example 4. For the commons game with preference information Λcro in Example
1, the best response functions of agent 1, who is pro-social, are r11(m
2) = 0 and
r1S(m
2) =
√
a
3
− m2. For agent 2, who is pro-self, the best response functions are
r21(m
1) =
−2m1+
√
(m1)2+3a
3
, and r2S(m
1) =
√
a
3
−m1. The set of crossed equilibria is
EΛcro(G) =
{
(m1,m2) ∈ IR2+ : m1 +m2 =
√
a
3
}
.
Remark. It is interesting to note that the set of crossed equilibria of the game of the
commons coincides with the intersection of the set of pro-social equilibria and the
set of pro-self equilibria.
5 Conservative equilibria in the commons
The set of equilibria of game G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} has been reduced by incorporat-
ing information into the model about the preferences of the agents with respect to
the results of all the group. However, we still have a set with an infinite number
of equilibria. Therefore, further refinements based on additional decision rules are
needed in order to identify a more realistic set of equilibria. In this section, we con-
sider a conservative rule to identify a reduced set of pro-social equilibria, a reduced
set of pro-self equilibria, and a reduced set of crossed equilibria of the game of the
commons with other-regarding agents.
We assume that the agents show a conservative attitude with respect to the
different utility values that can be obtained. That is, we consider that the agents are
averse to the uncertainty underlying the weights assigned to the different utilities. In
a conservative equilibrium, the agents select the strategies that maximize the worst
outcomes that can be obtained with the possible weights. Thus, agent i evaluates
an action profile m ∈ ×ni=1Ai as the minimum weighted value among all the feasible
weights in his preference information set. Formally, the value function of agent i is:
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vcΛi(m) = min
λi∈Λi
n∑
j=1
λijuj(m).
5.1 Conservative equilibria with pro-social agents
If an agent i is pro-social and conservative then his value function is
vcΛisoc(m) = minλi∈Λisoc
n∑
j=1
λijuj(m).
The minimum of a linear function on a polyhedron is reached at one of its extreme
points. Since for each m,
∑n
j=1 λ
i
juj(m) is linear with respect to λ, and the extreme
points of Λisoc are (
1
n−1 , . . . , 0.i), . . . ,
1
n−1), (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), then it follows that
vcΛisoc(m) = min

n∑
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n− 1V (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
 =
=
{ ∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M) if m
i ≥∑nj=1 mjn∑n
j=1
mj
n
V (M) if mi ≤∑nj=1 mjn
When a pro-social agent applies this conservative rule, the valuation of a profile of
strategies depends on the relationship between the number of units used by himself
and the average of the total units used. That is, when mi ≥ ∑nj=1 mjn then the
preferences of agent i leads to consider the average of the benefits of all agents
except for his own. However, when mi ≤ ∑nj=1 mjn , agent i considers the average
benefit of all agents including his own.
The following result characterizes the set of conservative pro-social equilibria of
the game of the commons G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}.
Proposition 8. The set of conservative pro-social equilibria of the game G =
{(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EcΛsoc(G) =
{
(m1, ...,mn) : mi = mj,∀i, j ∈ N, 0 ≤ mi ≤ S
∗
n
}
.
Example 5. In Example 2 the value function for agent i when a conservative attitude
is considered in the set of feasible weights Λsoc is
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vcΛisoc(m
1,m2) =
{
mjV (M) if mi ≥ mj
mi+mj
2
V (M) if mi ≤ mj
The corresponding best response function of agent i to the actions of agent j is
ri(mj) =
{
mj if 0 ≤ mj ≤√ a
12√
a
3
−mj if √ a
12
≤ mj ≤√a
8
and the set of conservative pro-social equilibria is
EcΛsoc(G) =
{
(m1,m2) =
(√
a
12
,
√
a
12
)− γ (√ a
12
,
√
a
12
)
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} .
Figure 4 represents the reaction function of agent 1 (left-hand side) and the set
of conservative pro-social equilibria (right-hand side).
m1
m2
r1
m1
m2
EcΛsoc(G)
Figure 4: The reaction set of agent 1 and conservative pro-social equilibria
5.2 Conservative equilibria with pro-self agents
If an agent i is pro-self and conservative then his value function is
vcΛiself
(m) = min
λi∈Λiself
n∑
j=1
λijuj(m).
Taking into account that the extreme points of Λiself are (0, . . . , 1.i), . . . , 0) and
( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), and that this function is linear, it follows that
vcΛiself
(m) = min
{
miV (M),
n∑
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
}
=
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={
miV (M) if mi ≤∑nj=1 mjn∑n
j=1
mj
n
V (M) if mi ≥∑nj=1 mjn
Under this conservative rule, the valuation of the preferences of a pro-self agent
depends also on the relationship between the number of units used by himself and
the average of the total units used. When mi ≤ ∑nj=1 mjn , this agent considers his
own benefit. However, when mi ≥ ∑nj=1 mjn , agent i considers the average of the
benefits of all agents including his own benefit.
The following result characterizes the set of conservative pro-self equilibria of the
game of the commons G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}.
Proposition 9. The set of conservative pro-self equilibria of G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EcΛself (G) = {(m1, ...,mn) : mi = mj,∀i, j = 1, . . . , n,
S∗
n
≤ mi ≤ M
∗
n
}.
Example 6. In Example 3 the value function of agent i when a conservative attitude
is considered in the set of feasible weights Λself is
vc
Λiself
(m1,m2) =
{
miV (M) if mi ≤ mj
mi+mj
2
V (M) if mi ≥ mj
The corresponding best response function of agent i to the action of agent j is
ri(mj) =

√
a
3
−mj if 0 ≤ mj ≤√ a
12
mj if
√
a
12
≤ mj ≤√a
8
−2mj+
√
(mj)2+3a
3
if
√
a
8
≤ mj ≤ √a
and the set of conservative pro-self equilibria is
EcΛself (G) =
{
(m1,m2) = γ
(√
a
12
,
√
a
12
)
+ (1− γ) (√a
8
,
√
a
8
)
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} .
Figure 5 shows the reaction function of agent 1 (left-hand side) and the set of
conservative pro-self equilibria (right-hand side).
Note that when agents show a conservative attitude both the conservative pro-
social equilibria and the conservative pro-self equilibria are symmetric equilibria.
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Figure 5: The reaction set of agent 1 and conservative pro-self equilibria
5.3 Conservative equilibria with pro-social and pro-self agents
Assume that the set of agents is divided into two groups: the set of pro-social agents,
Nsoc, and the set of pro-self agents, Nself . The following result characterizes the set
of conservative crossed equilibria of the game of the commons G = {(Ai, u)i∈N}.
Proposition 10. The set of conservative crossed equilibria of G = {(Ai, u)i∈N} is
EcΛcro(G) = {m ∈ IRn+ :
∑
i∈N
mi = S∗, mi ≤ S
∗
n
, for i ∈ Nsoc, S
∗
n
≤ mi ≤ M
∗
n
, for i ∈ Nself}.
Example 7. For the commons game with preference information Λcro in Example
4, when agent 1 is pro-social, agent 2 is pro-self and a conservative attitude is
considered, then the set of conservative crossed equilibria is
EcΛcro(G) =
{
(m1,m2) = γ
(√
a
12
,
√
a
12
)
+ (1− γ) (0,√a
3
)
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} .
Figure 6 shows the set of conservative crossed equilibria.
6 Concluding remarks
The role of the agents with other-regarding preferences when they use a common-
pool resource have been analized in this paper. Agents care about the relationship
between their results and the results of the other agents using the commons. In this
context we specifically focus on those agents that consider the outcomes of the others
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m1
m2
Ec⇤cro(G)
r2
r1
Figure 6: The set of conservative crossed equilibria
equally, and also on those agents which are capable of diminishing their personal
well-being to increase that of the others.
We have modeled the value functions of the agents as depending on the results of
the other agents. The preferences of the agents could more generally be modeled as
depending on the value judgements of the others. This requires more complex func-
tional forms which under certain assumptions can be reduced to the representation
adopted here (see, for instance, Hori (2009)). However, in our competitive setting,
since in order to choose their strategies, agents act individually, a representation of
the preferences based only upon the observed results seems to be a more accurate
description of the judgements of the agents.
Our analysis helps explain how the different behavior of the agents can mitigate
the overuse of the commons, since the incorporation of other-regarding preferences
into the model suggests situations where the overuse of the resources is reduced.
The results herein show, on the one hand, that if only an agent exhibits a pro-social
behavior, regardless of the behavior of the rest of the agents, the tragedy of the
commons can be avoided. On the other hand, pro-self agents can mitigate depletion
of the common resources, because the tragedy of the commons is only one of the
possible equilibria to where the agents can eventually arrive.
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Furthermore, it is worth remarking that when all the agents show the same
attitude, either in the case of pro-social agents, or in the case of pro-self agents, a
conservative rule leads them to adopt strategies in which all of them make use of the
common at the same level. In other words, at equilibria, they make an equitable use
of the resources regardless of the total quantity they are using. In contrast, when
agents with different attitudes are using the resources, a conservative rule forces
that the quantity at equilibria be the social maximum, although in these cases, not
surprisingly, at equilibria pro-social agents never use the resources at a higher level
than pro-self agents.
These results imply that recommendations on the choice of economic policies can
go beyond the traditional measures based on self-interested agents. In models with
this kind of agents, the literature shows that the tragedy of the commons might be
avoided with cooperative agreements. The fulfillment of these agreements requires
from the policy maker the design of an effective mechanism of punishment. However,
our results point out that policy makers should stress the incentives that lead agents
to adopt a pro-social behavior, instead of focusing of punishment. In addition, the
incentive to pro-social attitude could be more effective in preventing the depletion
of the resources. This appreciation is specially relevant because the punishment
applies once the agreement has been breached and therefore the damage is already
done, while the role of the incentive is to prevent the misuse of the resource. In
this sense, our findings provide information that might be useful in the formulation
of management strategies for common-pool resources and may contribute to design
more effective environmental policies.
7 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
a) If agent i is equanimous, then for all u ∈ IRn, νi(u) = νi(upi). Thus, for u¯
such that u¯j = 1 and u¯k = 0 for k 6= j, νi(u¯) = λij. Since for all k, a permutation
exists such that νi(u¯pi) = λ
i
k, it follows that λ
i
j = λ
i
k.
The reverse is straightforward.
b) The result follows by applying the same reasoning as in a) to the set N \ i.
c) Suppose on the contrary that λij = 0 for all j 6= i, thus λii = 1, then νi(u) =
λiiui < λ
i
iu¯i = ν
i(u¯), and this contradicts νi(u¯) ≤ νi(u).
Reciprocally, consider λij > 0 for some j 6= i. Take u such that uk = 0 for k 6= j, and
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uj = a, with a >
λii + λ
i
j
λij
, and u¯ such that u¯i = 1, u¯j = 1, and u¯k = 0 for k 6= i, j.
Then νi(u¯) < νi(u).
d) Since an egoistic agent is the opposite of an altruistic agent, then from c) it
follows that i is egoistic if and only if λij = 0 for all j 6= i.
Proof of Proposition 1.
It follows from the strict concavity of each uj with respect to the action of
agent i and from Theorem 1, that the set of equilibria is {(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ ×i∈NAi :
ri(m−i) ≤ mi ≤ r¯i(m−i), i ∈ N}, where ri(m−i) = minj∈N rij(m−i), and r¯i(m−i) =
maxj∈N rij(m
−i).
For each agent i, the i-th component of u, ui(m) = m
iV (
∑
i∈N m
i), provides the
same reaction function as the scalar game with pay-off function miV (
∑
i∈N m
i), that
is, rii(m
−i) = ri(m−i). When agent i considers the j-component of u, j 6= i, uj(m) =
mjV (
∑
i∈N m
i), since V (M) is strictly decreasing, the maximum of uj(m
i,m−i) with
respect to mi is attained at mi = 0. That is to say, rij(m
−i) = 0, for j 6= i. The
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The set Λisoc is a polyhedron whose extreme points are (
1
n−1 , . . . , 0i), . . . ,
1
n−1) and
( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
). Since the components of the utility functions of the original game are
strictly concave, and the transformed utility of agent i is viΛsoc = B
i · ui, where Bi is
a matrix whose rows are the extreme points of Λisoc, then from Theorem 2 the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.
It follows from the strict concavity of each uj with respect to the action of
agent i and from Theorem 1, that the set of equilibria is {(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ ×i∈NAi :
ri(m−i) ≤ mi ≤ r¯i(m−i), i ∈ N}, where ri(m−i) = minj∈N rij(m−i), and r¯i(m−i) =
maxj∈N rij(m
−i).
Note that since V (M) is decreasing, then the maximum of
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M) with
respect to mi is attained at mi = 0. Therefore, for the first component of the
transformed game the reaction function is rˆi1(m
−i) = 0 for j 6= i. For the second
component, the reaction function rˆi2(m
−i) is the reaction function with respect to
the aggregated utility, riS(m
−i) = S∗ −∑nj=1
j 6=i
mj. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.
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Since the set Λiself is a polyhedron whose extreme points are (0, . . . , 1i), . . . , 0)
and ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), the components of the utility functions of the original game are
concave and viΛself = B
i ·ui, where Bi is a matrix whose rows are the extreme points
of Λiself , by applying Theorem 2, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5.
In order to determine the set of pro-self equilibria for the game, we consider
the reaction function of agent i for each component of his value function. Since
the first component is his own benefit then the reaction function of agent i with
respect to the first component is rˆi1(m
−i) = ri(m−i). For the second component,
the reaction function rˆi2(m
−i) coincides with the reaction function of the aggregated
utility, riS(m
−i) = S∗ −∑nj=1
j 6=i
mj.
To prove that riS(m
−i) ≤ ri(m−i) for all i ∈ N , first note that riS(m−i) is the
best action of agent i when he maximizes MV (M), hence, V (riS(m
−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) +
(riS(m
−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj)V ′(riS(m
−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) = 0. Moreover, ri(m
−i) is the best
action of agent i when he maximizesmiV (M), and therefore, V (ri(m−i)+
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj)+
ri(m−i)V ′(ri(m−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) = 0.
Suppose that for some i ∈ N, riS(m−i) > ri(m−i). Since V is strictly decreas-
ing and strictly concave, that is, V ′ is also strictly decreasing, then V (riS(m
−i) +∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) < V (ri(m−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) and V ′(riS(m
−i) +
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) < V ′(ri(m−i) +∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) < 0. Therefore, V (riS(m
−i)+
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj)+(riS(m
−i)+
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj)V ′(riS(m
−i)+∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj) < V (ri(m−i)+
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj)+ri(m−i)V ′(ri(m−i)+
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj). This contradicts
the fact that the two expressions above are equal to zero.
Therefore, riS(m
−i) ≤ ri(m−i) for all i ∈ N . The result now follows from Theo-
rem 1.
Proof of Proposition 6.
This result follows analogously as in Propositions 2 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 7.
It follows from the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5, that for i ∈ Nsoc, rˆi1(m−i) = 0
for j 6= i, Hence, from Theorem 1, if m ∈ EΛcro(G), then mi ≤ S∗ −
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj, that
is, S∗ ≥∑nj=1mj.
For i ∈ Nself , riS(m−i) < ri(m−i), thus, if m ∈ EΛcro(G), them mi ≥ riS(m−i) =
S∗ −∑nj=1
j 6=i
mj, and mi ≥ S∗ −∑nj=1
j 6=i
mj, that is, S∗ ≤∑nj=1mj. As a consequence,
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S∗ =
∑n
j=1m
j.
Proof of Proposition 8.
We first prove that the conservative pro-social equilibria, as defined above, are
pro-social equilibria. That is, EcΛsoc(G) ⊆ EΛsoc(G) = {(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ IRn+ :∑
i∈N m
i ≤ S∗}. Let m ∈ ×ni=1Ai such that
∑
im
i > S∗, then any agent i ∈ N can
improve his conservative utility by moving to mi − ε, since both ∑nj=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M),
and
∑n
j=1
mj
n
V (M) are decreasing with respect to mi.
Now, consider a profile of strategies m ∈ EΛsoc(G) such that mi <
∑n
j=1
mj
n
and∑
j∈N m
j < S∗, then vcΛisoc(m) =
∑n
j=1
mj
n
V (M). Since vcΛisoc is strictly concave with
respect to the actions of agent i, and its maximum is attained at S∗, then if agent
i moves to mi + ε, the function vcΛisoc increases. Therefore, m /∈ EcΛsoc(G).
For m ∈ EΛsoc(G) such that mi <
∑n
j=1
mj
n
and
∑
j∈N m
j = S∗, an agent k 6= i
exists, such that mk >
∑n
j=1
mj
n
. For this agent vc
Λksoc
(m) =
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M). Since
the best response is now mk = 0, then, if agent k moves to mk − ε, the function
vc
Λksoc
increases. Therefore, m /∈ EcΛsoc(G).
Analogously, for any m ∈ EΛsoc(G) with mi >
∑n
j=1
mj
n
, if agent i moves to
mi − ε, then function vcΛisoc(m) =
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M) increases and m /∈ EcΛsoc(G).
Finally, consider m ∈ EΛsoc(G), such that for all i ∈ N , mi =
∑n
j=1
mj
n
. It
follows that mi = mj for all i, j ∈ N . Then, if agent i moves to mi + ε, vcΛisoc(m) =∑n
j=1
j 6=i
mj
n−1V (M) decreases, and if he moves to m
i − ε, vcΛisoc(m) =
∑n
j=1
mj
n
V (M)
decreases. Therefore, m ∈ EcΛsoc(G).
Since
∑
i∈N m
i ≤ S∗ and mi = mj for all i, j ∈ N , it also follows that 0 ≤ mi ≤
S∗
n
.
Proof of Proposition 9. Following an analogous reasoning to that of the proof
of Proposition 8, it can be shown that if point m ∈ EΛself (G) with S
∗
n
≤ mi ≤
M∗
n
, mi = mj, for all i, j ∈ N , then m ∈ EcΛself (G), and that if i, j ∈ N exist such
that mi 6= mj then m /∈ EcΛself (G).
Proof of Proposition 10. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 8 and Propo-
sition 9.
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